Madar
MadarمدارPersonal & Workspace Suite
Technical Documentation Portal · v1.0

Madar Suite Documentation

Architectural and operational guides for Madar Personal, Self-Hosted Workspace Server, Policy Engine, and REST/WebSocket APIs.

Technical Documentation Portal/Security, Governance & Compliance·5 min read·Updated: 2026-11-06

DLP Watermarks & Cryptographic Selective Wipe

Dynamic identity watermarks, copy/paste and external share controls, 30-day offline self-wipe, and Ed25519 signed wipe proofs.

Three-Layer Access Revocation & Selective Wipe Proof

When an administrator triggers a device wipe or offboards an employee:

1. Server-Side Revocation (Immediate): Access and refresh tokens are revoked in PostgreSQL and active WebSocket connections are terminated.

2. Connected Client Selective Wipe: The client receives device.wipe, shreds the workspace vault's AES-256-GCM key and SQLite database (madar_vault_<vaultId>.db), leaves the Personal Vault untouched, and submits an Ed25519 signature over wipe:<device_id>:<workspace_id> to POST /api/v1/devices/:id/wipe-ack.

3. Offline Monotonic Clock Self-Wipe: If a device remains offline beyond the policy grace window (and past the 30-day ceiling measured by a tamper-resistant monotonic clock), the client automatically executes selective wipe on next launch.